Ludwig (as in ludology, but also, narrative cohesiveness & thematic leitmotifs)

mild spoilers follow for the first three episodes of the British mystery series Ludwig, although it’s so charmingly by-the-numbers I’m not too sure I’m giving anything away
I don’t know how a friend of mine got started on talking about David Mitchell, but I recently confessed to someone that I just love him: a dorky little geek, posh, but whip-smart and so, so weird. An unconventional thinker. And the more uncomfortable he is—the more he squirms or the more he comes unglued—the harder I laugh.
Mitchell knows his own comedic strengths, so he’s been capitalizing on this particular combination of traits for a while, weaponizing them against a very willing audience. I didn’t mention it to my friend, but I also love his dark eyes—why are they so dark?? Are they all pupil?—the beady, shiny, all-seeing eyes of either a coldblooded killer or just a regular-blooded bird.
BritBox had repeatedly started autoplaying the cozy mystery series Ludwig at me, so I eventually surrendered, fine, just ‘cause you want me to watch it so bad, let’s see what this is all about.
What it is about is a nebbish, mildly agoraphobic puzzle constructor (crosswords et al) whose police-detective twin brother has gone missing. His brother’s wife convinces him to slip into the workplace dressed as his brother and, well, wacky hijinks ensue, obviously. At first Ludwig just wants to go home—until he realizes there’s something here he can sink his teeth into, and then he lights up.
Ultimately Ludwig is about a gamer—the real kind, not a marketing term—who is thrust into a series of nested games. Play-acting as his twin brother gives the main character the appeal of a video game’s “amnesiac protagonist,” constantly learning1 what “he” does and does not do—his brother takes sugar in his coffee!—based on easy-to-miss social context clues, such as the faces around him expressing constant, open bewilderment.
In the first episode our protagonist races away from a crime scene—too many people, too much blood—to sit privately, catch his breath, breathe his own air, and review the notes. He returns to the scene with sudden conviction and vigor, knowing exactly how to solve a murder.
Then he draws—as you always knew he eventually would—a square table, the kind you use for the board game Clue, solving by process of elimination. Since this is also a logic riddle, he draws two wings on the side, representing “added dimensions,” like if you unfolded a faceted shape and laid it flat. (This is only one type of puzzle he solves; the types of games2 he plays to calculate different types of solutions do vary from episode to episode, as different solutions call for different systems.)
We never actually get to follow his mental process3, which is maddening. We take it on faith that he is a “genius” (“two points higher, actually”), that the way he is solving is a way of solving—but if you’d like to follow along at home filling out your own magic square, tough. Rather, this is all an excuse to watch David Mitchell maniacally A Beautiful Mind his way through social deduction, drawing Xs across a whiteboard, as if everything in life might be reduced to a sophisticated game of Minesweeper.
Therein is whence the “coziness” of this particular cozy mystery is derived. The title protagonist is a staid luddite, technophobic, who takes notes by hand, who is content using his 1999ish Nokia candybar phone to communicate, who eschews the Internet in a sort of priestly way. He is easier to rattle than the rest of us, certainly, because he is basically blithe, untouched by A.I., all systems online, insulated, a nervous wreck, doing all his own thinking from inside a self-made vacuum. This makes him a pain for others to be around, akin to Mr. Monk, as others are regularly shunted into the thankless task of scrolling and clicking for him. He is the only one who gets to draw Xs across an elaborate Tic-Tac-Toe board. It is therefore strongly implied that his own life is a locked-room puzzle of a sort.
And of course I was wheezing throughout the first episode, because, as I complained about All Her Fault, this is not how you shake out the truth when investigating a murder. We do not adventure-game or Clue our way through crime, as much as Police Quest4 might tell us otherwise.
The first episode ends with Ludwig’s solve being celebrated at the precinct. One underling, whom we are warned ahead of time is “by-the-book,” is beyond distraught. You cannot be serious, she is all like. Where is the evidence? Where is the investigation??
“Yes!” I exclaimed at the TV, laughing.
Well, it doesn’t matter this time, the chief sighs, since they received a full how-and-whydunnit when the perpetrator tearfully confessed. (“Crime of passion,” the chief—or rather the D.C.S., whatever that means—tells them flatly. Everyone sighs. Motives are rarely satisfying; they always feel tacked-on, trite.)
But by the third episode, our unlikely puzzle-solving protagonist is at his wits’ end. “The puzzle is impossible,” he finally exclaims. “Solving it would require there to be fewer variables than suspects,” he says. “Any one of them could’ve done it! I think we’re going to need to find a motive5 with this one,” he says now, trying, for once, to sound like a real detective.
He says this in front of the police commissioner (or rather, the chief constable, your guess is as good as mine here6), who is astonished and probably offended. “You haven’t been looking into motives?” he balks.
Our protagonist unwisely answers him: “Well, they’re very secondary, aren’t they,” he says. “If you can demonstrate who did it and how, then the why doesn’t really matter.”
And I sighed, pausing the television to dwell on this point, because the puzzle constructor is right. The police cannot tolerate being around him because they are in the business of constructing narratives, using suspects, motives, evidence, timelines, to create a plausible cover story. Their primary method—at least on television!—is narratology. To write a story a judge and juror can believe in.
But now they’re trapped with a seemingly bodysnatched D.C.I. who, by process of elimination, collapses possibilities until only one exists. That’s ludology, that’s systems: finding the truth without getting glazed by a good story.
You know, I passed an online MCAT7 practice quiz once, just because I was able to look at a big obnoxious table of blood data and interpret all the results correctly (I was not, however, able to answer any vocabulary questions, because I was just goofing off: it’s not like I’ve ever studied for the MCAT). It was a logic problem, a manifold process-of-elimination riddle. And I’ve always kept my favorite middle-school trophy—for “lab techniques”—because, although my techniques are unstoppable, I’d equally won it for using inventive, even florid descriptive language in my notes of my findings, without ever once including any opinions or biases or any other crimes of self-insertion. This is a precarious balancing act, similar to the platonic ideal of newswriting, and I was the only one in my summer science class who could do it without making mistakes.
And then I briefly had my dream job—receiving raw info from a data scientist8, helping him interpret it, then sitting down to write an expository narrative, so that a lay audience could also understand the data—but the new boss wanted a full-time employee, not a part-time consultant. He hoped I’d apply again! for the job I already had. (I was unmoored by this series of events, which ultimately compelled me to seek a diagnosis, an answer for why I was so physically ill, at Stanford. Which means I’m very grateful for what happened, grateful to’ve learned my own strengths at work, then sent on my merry way to learn my own weaknesses and deficiencies on top of it.)
I grimly admit I lionized the magazine writer Malcolm Gladwell for a long time, because I’d thought this was what he was doing with his own writing, as well. He isn’t. He doesn’t map the terrain at all; he just cuts the shortest path between two data points and then writes it down. Lazy9. That’s what cops do: shoddy investigative work.
Unpausing the television again, it was only a scant couple of minutes before false confessions—pleading guilty despite an ironclad alibi—became part of series 1’s overarching plot. (“Which detective did you speak to?” “I don’t know. There were lots of different ones. They kept coming for days, trying to get me to change my story.”) The police, eager to collar someone for something specific, had hammered away at their patsy until he’d become smelted enough to be worked into a shape that fit their narrative.
Moments like these don’t often descend on the show’s lead character, at least so far. Rather, it is the main character’s sister-in-law—doing her own legwork, making calls, resorting to social engineering and little white lies, navigating real-life dialogue trees—who typically gets the juice. She manages the game narratology, gathering info, gifting her brother-in-law with context so he has any idea of what he’s looking for, or even how to get around10.
It is in episode 3, however, that our lead actor finally realizes he can only solve by doing: by inhabiting the shoes of his murder victim and reproducing her steps, so that he can better see what she saw11.
Well, I guess I’ve watched the first half of series 1 of Ludwig now. I might just smash the publish button, follow up with a part 2, and regret writing this in the first place.
Almost every adventure game casts you in the role of some sort of a private investigator; there’s an entire book of scholarship about this, called Adventure Games: Playing the Outsider, which I stopped reading because I wished I’d written it.
The perfect detective (and juror and executioner) of recent gaming memory is Lady Love Dies. As Lady Love (or Love Dies?), you’ve been imprisoned so long, you have to be nudged along, reminded of where your loyalties lie, of your own personal history. In this way, your own biographical clues become no more or less important than the actual recent events you’re investigating.
Built into the video game Paradise Killer is this: the horror of never really knowing what happened. You’ll always be operating on a deficit of information; you can never know anything for sure, no matter how long you let your fact-finding mission drag on. The game only ends by choosing to act, by rendering judgment and enacting justice. I find it easiest to just shoot the guy I like the least, ‘cause he definitely did something wrong.↩
The second episode of Ludwig is solved by playing a game of “Spot the Difference.”
I happen to know the world’s greatest Spot the Difference player. Back in the day, a crowd would gather around him at the bar as he absolutely rocked the dollar-bill-fed countertop machine. He moved like lightning, computer-fast, a maniac.
“What’s the secret?” I finally whispered, wanting to know how his magic trick was done. I promised I’d never tell—this might really be the green ribbon tied around my neck—but now is prime time to give away the solution, I think.
“I cross my eyes,” he whispered, and then he laughed giddily.
That is, he was able to look at the screen from two different angles at the same time, processing two similar-but-competing images with one big brain: the opposite of a Magic Eye picture.
It’s simpler than it sounds, even. Visually, you just overlay the pictures. From there, spotting the difference is easy. You just tap the flickering ghosts, the stray things that occupy one space but not the other. Solved!
I highly suspect that a lot of things work this way: using two “masters,” overlaying them, circling the mismatches. But if I try to explain further I’ll disintegrate very quickly.↩
I thought about this for a while—ruminating on my own desire for the protagonist to “show his work” to us—and then I thought about how frustrating math classes were for me, when I just knew the answer, okay??, and the effort of articulating how I’d solved, the effort of telling, was what’d always tripped me up. Ah! Rejected from STEM because I still count on my fingers.
In spite of my dyscalculia, I’m really good at speculative math, projected calculations, estimation, averages. Practical math. My party trick is eyeballing a grocery cart and telling you how much something is going to cost, within a margin of a couple bucks. God, everything I say sounds like a lie! It’s easier to just show you! Anyway, it’s when I individually add items up that I start making mistakes.
Recently I pulled up to the gas station in time to see a young employee struggling to pull a trashbag out of its big gray bin. I gazed at her beautiful, fluffy ponytail as I parked. She had paused, gasping and defeated and looking around for a coworker to assist, just as I locked my car. I walked toward her.
“Hey! Can I hold the bin for you?” I asked her.
“That would be… awesome,” she gasped.
I nodded and planted my hands on the sides of the bin, planted my feet in a V. She continued to attempt to brute-force the bag out of the can. Something something larger gender issues at play here. Her bosses were probably bullying her. I almost said something like “get the boys to do this for you!” but then I remembered my own best friend-boss sadistically forcing me to learn to mop and squeegee, and wasn’t I grateful for that? I realized I really didn’t want to contribute to a stranger’s deskilling, even as a gender-affirming joke. I bit my lip and tried to keep my mouth shut; she was already frustrated as it was.
“Hmm,” I said, watching carefully from my side, “it’s getting caught.” The trashbag’s weight had shifted to the bottom of the bag, so that the bag was becoming too wide, the surface area of the bag too tense, too solid, for the trashbag to ooze out of its receptacle properly. It was going to tear if she kept on like this. Exhausted, she dropped the bag into the bin again.
“Do you think we should try it at an angle?” I asked her gently, looking toward an expanse of sidewalk. What I really meant was go stand over there, but various workplaces have conditioned me to phrase things passively. She sighed, nodded, and wordlessly stood over there.
I got my hands on the bin in a different way, getting a real good grip now, and then I tilted it deeply toward her. On the tip of my tongue now was “it’s like a reverse ketchup bottle,” but I didn’t say anything. I didn’t warn her at all. Instead, I gave the bin one firm, short jog, moving it toward her and back toward me again. We were both surprised. She’d unfortunately been yanking on the Hefty at the same time; this time she was expending way too much effort, and she reeled backward off the sidewalk and curb, landing right next to my car, blessedly on her feet, with the trash bag in both hands.
“Thank you!” she gasped, extremely startled.
“My pleasure,” I told her truthfully as I righted the trash bin. Wow! I thought to myself as I pushed the door to the gas station open, I guess I really did learn something about physics!
Absorbed, more like. Osmosis. I’d convinced my parents to buy Coaster for me as a kid. I’d tapped the box and said, of the game box’s edutainment marketing prose, “look, it’ll teach me physics.” Really, I’d wanted to construct imaginary coasters and force other ‘people’, imaginary computer people, to ride them for me, since I am too afraid to ride a coaster myself.
And I did learn something about torque and angles, but also kinetic energy and neck injuries (an oval-loop inversion puts less strain on your spine than a great big circle), and pacing. And then there’s the brutality of the sudden stop, where even a slight jog means the car stops but the riders keep going. See? It’s just like a ketchup bottle. You jerk the bottle, and then you stop the bottle by hitting it in the pickle with the other hand, so that the ketchup flows. That’s physics.↩
I was once detained in LA. The two police officers were silent. Very intimidating.
“LAPD! That’s exciting!” I finally said to them, making small talk. The young woman hesitated and then nodded.
I went silent for a spell, studying her. I idly wondered if this had been her childhood dream—not detaining me specifically, but enacting the long arm of the law in general. I continued eyeballing her, contemplative.
“Y’all ever play Police Quest growing up?” I finally asked them. “Police Quest IV, the one Daryl Gates consulted on?”
The young woman froze. Then she nodded again.
“Yeeeaaaahhhh!” I said.
If I were a runner—if I were to run from the law, I mean—she’s the one, in a fiction I mean, whose empathy I would’ve weaponized. Which would’ve made her very angry at me, angrier than the other guy could ever possibly get. This isn’t what happened, obviously, I’m just, uh, what’s it called. Extrapolating. If I were writing my own mystery novel, this is the direction I’d take it. But I suppose that, now that I’ve thought of it, it means the potential to get up to some real mayhem was always there inside me.↩
I have read, on the topic of dyscalculia, that the part of the brain that does mathematical calculations is the same part of the brain that calculates people’s motives—suggesting that people with dyscalculia, like me, are much easier to take advantage of.
This is irritating to read, and it might also be wrong. It isn’t a hard and fast rule, but people with dyscalculia often have a short-term “working” memory problem. I’m easy to take advantage of because I struggle with names, faces, dates, and keeping track of raw numbers in a counting-house. Like, when you take advantage of me, you’re effectively taking advantage of someone in elder care, someone with dementia, maybe the dude from Memento. Good for you.
Lately I think about the stories we tell one another, and how it might be best to think of all of them as fictions, especially since every narrative will necessarily be unreliable. People finesse the truth all the time, describing the vista from their side only, trying to reorient others—that is, to get others to do what they want—to rebalance or even tip a scale. That’s manipulative, that’s coercive, that’s a weaponization of others’ empathy, but not even in a nefarious way: it’s how babies are designed to get their needs met, by crying out as if in pain, lookin’ all vulnerable and cute like that. People are just peopling.↩
I’m trying to not overcomplicate matters, but this deserves its own footnote. What people’s ranks are supposed to be in some sort of arbitrary hierarchy is a very fluid, ketchuppy thing to me, even in the best of times. If L&O: SVU doesn’t graft perfectly onto British police procedurals, then I really don’t know. I’ve just kind of been making up words for things as I go, I guess. (“I-I assume that they’ve done a… a ‘how-did-they-die’ test—” “Postmortem?” “Postmortem!”)↩
Y’know, in med school, student doctors supposedly have to be reminded that there is no limit to how many diseases a patient can have simultaneously (apparently this is called Hickam’s dictum). That’s because doctors tend to look for a tidy narrative that accounts for every single symptom—which is how misdiagnoses happen, dangerous ones.
My best childhood friend texted me while I was returning an Amazon purchase in a Staples. “Did you see the news about Christina Applegate?” she asked me.
I texted back something rambling about how upsetting it was, yes.
“You said you didn’t think it sounded like M.S.!” my best friend texted me excitedly. “You said she needed a second opinion!”
No, I texted back, no chance—adding that this sounded far too tone-deaf to be me. No, but I do remember saying Selma Blair needed to get a grip on substance abuse because it’s impossible to disentangle neurodegenerative symptoms otherwise: that, I can remember saying, and it was a few years ago that I said that, so thank you very much for remembering.
My best friend was insistent. She claimed I’d said that doctors needed to look at Applegate again, investigate, that it sounded like a overlap of symptoms. “You said M.S. can mimic a lot of other illnesses. You called it!” she concluded.
With a mast cell component, I suddenly remembered. I sighed. Now it did sound like me, although I don’t super love the idea of me speculating on others’ diseases, especially already-diagnosed ones.
I texted something rambling again, this time admitting, okay, it was starting to sound like something I would say, historically speaking. Now I was angry. “Doctors get real excited about M.S.,” I explained, “because they’ve read about it in a textbook in school, and they’re very proud of themselves when they think they’ve spotted it in the wild.”
When my health problems escalated, doctors had been clear that it sounded like M.S., without actually investigating. No, try again, had been my answer, unnerving the experts, as if I were shopping for a sofa I wanted. (“It certainly might become M.S.,” I told one doctor, “I’m asking you to prevent or reverse it.”) I intuitively understood that M.S. symptoms are emergent over time, not a brick wall that hits you in the face all at once. I intuitively understood that I was living under the threat of M.S., that looking more carefully at wonky bloodwork and Guillain-Barre—the long-term postviral complications of a first mono infection at age 25—might prevent the disease etiology of M.S. over time. Well, my symptoms have remitted, so there’s very little to study or ponder at the moment. The laboratory is closed.↩
The main character, in series 1, episode 3: “Oh, thank goodness for that! A coincidence! We needed one of those. I mean, ideally we’d have three to be statistically significant, but one’s a start.” As my blog is, ultimately, a notes scratchpad, I’m taking this down for future reference, since I’ve never heard of such a thing before.
I’ve always tossed info that doesn’t “make sense”—getting tricked by certain pathological narratives that we all take for granted as true, consensus narratives—and when I bring up, in hushed tones, how much “anomalous” data I’ve tossed out over the course of my life, people are like “you know that thing where you notice something everywhere,” and I’m like “yes, Baader-Meinhof phenomenon, but feel free to explain it to me.” At a certain breaking point you have to admit to yourself you might have whatever the opposite of a confirmation bias is: head-in-the-sand syndrome, perhaps. (Besides, I love disconfirmation, I love being proven wrong, I love being converted—as I think so many of us do, possibly to the point of fault.)↩
A big part of the issue is deadlines, quotas.
But taking the shortcut every time is Occam’s Razor bullshit—that is, setting up a jury to believe a frame-up, using the shape of a tired cliche, giving jurors the easiest or most thrilling story to swallow, making them feel like the heroes of the day.
I think a lot about the fantasy of Matlock. It’s fantastical in a lot of ways, but it also reiterates this mythical idea that, if you can reconstruct someone’s movements perfectly, if you can guess at a crime’s procedure perfectly, the person on the stand will bow their head and break down (or clap in a sinister, antisocial way and purr “very good Mister Matlock, I suppose there’s no use pretending anymore”). You’ve done your due diligence ferreting out the truth, and now the big payoff: a confession.
Then there is Father Brown who, by dint of his job, recognizes that people are quietly confessing to their sins all the time. He’s a sort of Matlock, too. Instead of being a firebrand of the law, however, he good-cops the suspects, extending endless empathy, assuring them of an eventual road to redemption. Leniency.
Matlock, Father Brown, all very romantic. But this is also what happens in the room where confession is forced or coerced: where the individual is assured the story is airtight, no getting away from us now and if you give us what we want, perhaps you can expect leniency. This is not in service of the truth; this is in service of quotas.
I’ve come to appreciate an unglamorous defense: the energetic attorney who pokes little holes in the case against you until it completely deflates. I think that’s grand, especially if you’re down bad for a good defense.
In the Catholic Book of Susanna—which many scholars, and my own Oxford Bible, have declared the first written work of detective fiction—the title character, Susanna, chooses her own execution instead, proudly refusing to give a false confession to a trumped-up charge. It is Daniel (that Daniel!) who intervenes to defend her. And he does it just like Phoenix Wright, exposing contradictions in her accusers’ testimonies. It’s a very concise version of Twelve Angry Men, probably.↩
I’ve been remiss in letting this slide, not doing enough justice to the other lead character who is constantly shadowing the hero. Well, we always pay attention to the boys in class, don’t we.
In the first episode, there’s a very funny sequence where she points at the faces of everyone her brother-in-law might meet in his twin brother’s workplace, warns him who they are, and orients him around a blueprint of the building—so that he might get to his brother’s office and back out again unscathed.
But she cannot account for every possibility or contingency, is even angered when she realizes her spouse has deliberately withheld useful information from her. Nevertheless, it’s apparent from the jump that our puzzle aficionado would’ve never gotten into the office in the first place without his sister-in-law’s deliberate and thoughtful worldbuilding. Environmental storytelling.↩
Episode 2 of Ludwig, the “Spot the Difference” solution, is a bit boring—whereas episode 3 is much more explicitly about ‘angles’ and ‘blind spots’.
“When you’re investigating two cases, but you only think you’re investigating one, nothing is going to make any sense,” our hero tells a group of suspects, a pep in his step now. “Instead, it becomes a lateral-thinking puzzle. You have to recognize that something is missing and look for what that is in the variables.” In this episode, the mystery itself is, as ever, just okay. It’s more a matter of how the investigator gets there—or at least, how we’re told he gets there. (Rabble, rabble.)
This one did irritate me, if only because it undermines what I just said about Hickam’s dictum—that you can have a murderer for every crime, or multiple murderers, even!—but this is a work of fiction, I guess, and having two interconnected crimes reveal themselves in tandem is perfectly dramatic and delightful.↩